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# Dulles Stays Calm in Eye Of Literary Hurricane

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Dulles remained calm today, and once again disengaged himself from the admiring interpretations of another Time-Life writer.

While Capitol Hill resounded to senatorial demands for explanations of a claim in a biography of the Secretary by Time Reporter John Robinson Beal, that his cancellation of Aswan Dam financing was "a truly major gambit in the cold war," Mr. Dulles gave his news conference a more subdued account.

And on Mr. Beal's revelation that President Eisenhower had sent a "personal assurance" to Nationalist China's President Chiang Kai-shek that the United States would help defend Quemoy and Matsu, Mr. Dulles said there was no American commitment of any kind, secret or otherwise, beyond the Pormosa Resolution.

#### Indefinite on Messages

He added that he could not say definitely whether or not Mr. Eisenhower had sent any private messages to Chiang. Senators Sparkman and Humphrey, Democrats, called for Mr. Dulles to explain.

As during the press conference that followed the famous Life Magazine "Brink-of-War" profile of Mr. Dulles by James Shepley, the Secretary of State sought to translate into more diplomatic terms the somewhat swashbuckling attitudes attributed to him by journalistic admirers.

In the Shepley article, a January, 1956 sensation, Mr. Dulles was quoted as saying, "The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away

from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost."

At the height of the storm kicked up by that paragraph Mr. Dulles held a press conference and changed the brink of war phrasing to "a calculated risk for peace."

Again today, while steam was building up over the "truly major cold war gambit" characterization of our dramatic withdrawal from the Aswan Dam project, Mr. Dulles imperturbably reminded inquiring reporters that he did not comment on articles written about himself. At the same time, at a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Humphrey demanded that Mr. Dulles "come over here at the earliest opportunity and explain the Aswan Dam situation."

According to Mr. Beal's book, which the State Department has been at pains to declare "unauthorized," this was the Dulles point of view at the time he pulled the rug out from under Col. Nasser.

"It was necessary to call Russia's hand in the game of economic . . . competition . . . Nasser combined the right timing, the right geography and the right order of magnitude for a truly

major gambit in the cold war." Today, however, Mr. Dulles went to great lengths to show that this decision had been no calculated kick in the teeth to Col. Nasser, but instead the result of a variety of diplomatic considerations.

#### Puts Blame on Veto

In the first place, he said was the veto of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Then there was some question as to whether a project of such magnitude could be carried out to mutual advantage. Then there was the question of how the Egyptian people would take the austerity program that would be imposed on them as a result of such gigantic expenditures and the consequent problem that we might be disliked rather than liked for having made the project possible.

And our support, Mr. Dulles said, to a country which had been developing increasingly friendly relationships with the Soviet Union and had recently recognized Red China, might be interpreted by other nations as meaning that those who played both sides get better treatment than our stalwart allies.

Finally, Mr. Dulles said, there was no doubt as to the propriety of our answer and the courteous manner in which it was conveyed.

Reporters gave up after that, except for one who asked the Secretary if he had anticipated that as a result of our withdrawal from Aswan Col. Nasser would seize the Suez Canal.

The Secretary said no.

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